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The record of aid to fragile and poorly-performing states is the real test of aid 
effectiveness. Rich countries can justify aid to fragile states both through altruism and 
self-interest. But, with some exceptions, donors have appeared at the wrong times and 
with the wrong attitudes, even sometimes undermining development progress.  
State failure has dimensions of both will and capacity. Failure demands constructive 
engagement by donors, in some cases to save people in weak states from their leaders, 
and in all cases to save the states from circumstances which they cannot control. This 
paper examines the aid relationship with respect to three weak countries. Burma 
presents a case of comprehensive failure of political will and capacity, but isolating the 
regime, as some donors have chosen to do, will only perpetuate the plight of the 
population. Rwanda provides an alarming example of donor complicity in state 
collapse. The country has now rebounded from the terrible genocide of 1994, but some 
donors still cannot set aside their political and cultural biases. Zambia has lived through 
many years of bilaterally-assisted economic mismanagement, and also proved to be a  
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highly unsuitable case for Bretton Woods treatment. It is doing better now that the 
country is more willing and able to take control of its development agenda.  
The paper concludes with eight principles for donors to observe in engaging more 
productively with fragile states.  
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When countries give foreign economic aid, they have many motivations: 
humanitarian impulses, strategic concerns, interest group politics and 
simple bureaucratic inertia. We compared the amount of foreign aid 
countries receive per capita with the [Failed States] index ranking and 
found that the countries at greatest risk of collapse often get paltry 
amounts of aid. The exceptions appear to be countries that have been the 
recipients of large-scale international military intervention. 
Foreign Policy Magazine (Washington DC, June 2005) 
Although Australia has been a generous donor to East Timor, the 
Australian Government is reaping over $1 million per day from oil and 
gas in a disputed area of the Timor Sea that is twice as close to East 
Timor as it is to Australia. Australia has received nearly ten times as 
much revenue from Timor Sea oil and gas than it has provided in aid to 
East Timor since 1999  …  Australia has access to two-thirds of the 
known oil and gas deposits in the Timor Sea, even though a maritime 
boundary set according to international law could deliver most, if not all, 
these resources to East Timor.  
Oxfam Australia (2004a) 
1 Introduction 
Strong powers used to fear each other. Now their concerns emanate from states that are 
fragile and which threaten global stability. These states are still numerous; by most 
definitions, at least one-third of all developing countries. And they harbour up to 1.5 
billion people, almost a quarter of the world. 
Fragile states are of universal concern because they are the source of many of the most 
challenging global problems. Many are chronically prone to conflict—with more than a 
dozen civil wars raging at any one time. Some are major exporters of narcotic drugs 
(Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia). Some are developing nuclear weapons and exporting 
the capability to develop them (North Korea and Pakistan). They are incubators of 
violence and terrorism, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban regime and Somalia 
today. In the zones of death, people are displaced, property is destroyed and natural 
resources are plundered. Weak states are also host to traffickers of people and to the still 
widespread practice of slave-labour. People quit failing states under the threat of 
persecution or economic deprivation and seek asylum or refugee status elsewhere.  
Fragile states are also stalked by the silent crises of peacetime. People still starve to 
death in them—as in some of the West African countries in 2005—and epidemic 
diseases can grow and spread alarmingly. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is the most obvious 
example, with 40 million carriers of the virus worldwide and 5 million additional 
infections every year. The much older disease of malaria—until recently the cause of 
even higher mortality rates in Africa than HIV/AIDS—has been almost completely 
eradicated in many tropical countries, but continues to afflict countries which have not 
applied the resources to sustain national campaigns. And polio, a disease spread by poor 
sanitation, but which can be controlled through universal immunization with a vaccine   2
discovered 50 years ago, is still endemic in six countries (Afghanistan, Egypt, India, 
Niger, Nigeria and Pakistan). In 2005, it was carried across borders to several others, 
including Indonesia and Yemen.  
Richer countries have more reasons than ever to address this new world disorder. But 
the record has been uneven, to say the least. The world power has helped to create a 
failed state, for a variety of self-interested motives, contributing to even greater global 
insecurity. The aid supposed to support Iraqi reconstruction has been mired in 
distortions designed to maximize the benefits for US companies.1,2 Elsewhere, donors 
have been inconstant partners. Many of the most fragile countries receive little 
assistance. Just as with all developing countries, donors have many criteria for 
allocating—or not allocating—aid.  
But even if need were the main incentive, trying to compensate for failure poses 
dilemmas. It is in the failing states where the intended beneficiaries of aid—the poor 
and marginalized—are worst off and who most urgently need to be reached. But under 
the prevailing orthodoxy, donors are inclined to withhold aid from governments with 
weak policy and governance records. Aiding fragile states carries high stakes. Aid 
driven by motives other than need can be destructive. But the right aid applied in the 
right manner can transform the prospects of millions of people. 
This paper examines state failure as an aid concern—and the failings of aid in the face 
of fragility. It first looks at poor development performance as a criterion for state 
failure. It then examines the anatomy of failed states and enquires about some common 
causes, taking a closer look at three states in particular: Burma, Rwanda and Zambia. 
Finally it asks how donor engagement could address the twin challenges of state failure: 
lack of political will and incapacity. 
2  Failing development performance 
The notion of development laggards is not new. In 1971, the UN identified a category of 
25 least developed countries (LDCs) defined by three sets of criteria: low income levels 
(less than gross national income (GNI) per head of US$775); a low human assets index 
(a composite of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy); and high economic 
vulnerability (volatility of agricultural production and trade, small economic size and 
proneness to natural disasters). Least developed status was consistent with the 
traditional orthodoxy of aid entitlement. It was equated with a priority for aid, as 
compensation for what was construed as inherent disadvantage. Within the overall 
target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for aid from the OECD countries, a target of 0.15–0.20 per 
cent was established for the LDCs, although it was never respected. (OECD aid for the 
LDCs actually fell by 20 per cent in real terms during the 1990s, which is much more 
than the overall aid decline.)  
                                                 
1   E.g., Krugman (2006). Electric power could have been restored much faster if existing plants had been 
rebuilt by the original European contractors. Instead, US companies started building new ones. 
2  Indeed the cost of destroying and then attempting to rebuild the state of Iraq—recently estimated at 
US$2 trillion (sic)—is so monumental as to make arguments about the value of aid rather spurious.   3
The sole graduate from this dismal club is the well-governed Botswana. Otherwise, the 
overall numbers of the LDCs have grown steadily and there are now 50, seeming to 
vitiate the criteria of natural disadvantage. Most LDCS would be unambiguously 
included among the poorest performers. 
For many years, countries were compared using data of GNP growth and levels of 
income per head. From 1990, the UN Development Programme broadened the income 
criterion and began analysing development performance by ranking countries according 
to a human development index (HDI).3 The rankings immediately enlivened the 
development debate, especially because they were published at a time when many 
bilateral donors were reviewing their criteria for beneficiary selection.4 
Development results, and especially human development outcomes, provide an 
objective basis for determining individual country performance. There is now a wide 
range of indicators of overall performance available and in this section we look at a 
sample of empirical surveys. Depending on the definitions used, the number of poor 
performers ranges from around 30 to 60, which is a significant proportion of aid clients 
(see Table 1). 
Other contemporary research has defined a failing state as ‘a low-income country in 
which economic policies, institutions and governance are so poor that growth is highly 
unlikely’, a more recent study suggests that almost all the countries in our table (for 
which data are available) show a consistently poor performance. Some are described as 
failing for more than 20 years (Chauvet and Collier 2005). 
The most comprehensive and most widely acknowledged set of indicators for 
developing country performance tracking is the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The MDGs are based on the seven international development goals originally 
drawn up by the OECD in 1996, which were derived from a selection of targets defined 
by the global development conferences convened by the UN during the 1990s. There is 
nothing really new about these goals. A version of these OECD goals was incorporated 
into the Millennium Declaration which emerged from the Millennium Summit of world 
leaders called by the UN in September 2000.5 Following the Summit, an eighth goal, 
containing mainly the obligations of the developed countries was added (UNDP 
2003a).6 
                                                 
3   The HDI is a composite index which purports to measure average achievement along three dimensions 
of ‘human development’: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. For these it uses proxies: life 
expectancy for longevity; a combination of adult literacy and gross combined enrolment rates for 
knowledge; and a normalized calculation of GDP per head for standard of living. The HDI is 
measured from 0 to 0.100 and a level below 0.500 is determined to be ‘low human development’. 
4   UNDP was actually expelled from Oman because of an observation in a Human Development Report 
comparing the country unfavourably with Costa Rica. 
5   The term ‘Millennium Development Goal’ was first used in a country progress report on Tanzania, 
developed by the author in February 2001. 
6   Even though it was an obvious quid pro quo for monitoring developing country performance, the idea 
of goal 8 was strongly opposed by some of the donors at first. One of the most vocal opponents was 
the UK Secretary of State at the time, although subsequently the British government became more 
supportive.    4
Table 1 
Fragile states by different definitions 
Country(a  LDCs(b 










            
Afghanistan  √  √  na  √ 
Angola  √  √   133  √ 
Bangladesh  √    √ 145   
Benin  √  √     77  
Bhutan  √      na  
Burkina Faso  √  √  √ na   
Burma (Myanmar)  √       142  √ 
Burundi  √  √  √  na  √ 
Cambodia  √      na  √ 
Cameroon   √  √  √ 129   
Central African Rep.  √  √  √  √ na √ 
Chad  √  √  √ 142   
Congo DR  √  √  √   133  √ 
Congo Rep.      √   114  √ 
Equatorial Guinea  √      na  
Eritrea  √       102  √ 
Ethiopia  √  √  √ 114  √ 
Gabon         74   
Gambia  √    √   90   
Guinea  √  √  √ na   
Guinea-Bissau  √    √ na   
Haiti  √  √  √ 145  √ 
Indonesia       133  √ 
Côte d’Ivoire    √  √ 133  √ 
Kenya   √  √  √ 129   
Korea, North    (√) (√)   na  
Laos  √    √ na   
Lesotho  √  √  na  
Liberia  √  √  na  √ 
Madagascar  √  √  √   82   
Malawi  √         90  
Mali  √    √  √   77   
Mauritania  √  √  √ na   
Mongolia     √     85  
Mozambique  √  √     90  √ 
Nepal  √    √   90  √ 
Niger  √  √  √ 122   
Nigeria     √  √ 144  √ 
Pakistan       √ 129  √ 
Papua New Guinea          102  √ 
Rwanda  √  √  √ na √ 
Senegal  √    √   85   
Sierra Leone  √  √   114  √ 
Somalia  √      na  √ 
Sudan  √  √   122  √ 
          Table 1 continues  5
Table 1 (con’t) 
Fragile states by different definitions 
Country(a  LDCs(b 










            
Tanzania  √  √  √  √   90   
Timor-Leste  √      na  √ 
Togo  √  √  √ na   
Uganda  √    √ 102  √ 
Yemen  √  √  √ 112   
Zambia  √  √  √  √ 102   
Zimbabwe   √  √  √ 114   
         
TOTALS            52    40  9  32  28    25 
Notes:  (a  Excluding the smallest states and the transition countries; 
  (b  Excluding: Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Kiribati, Maldives, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu; 
  (c  Countries listed as ‘top priority’ for attainment of two or more MDGs (Source: UNDP 2003a); 
  (d  Low-income poorly performing states, defined by Center for Global Development, 
Washington, DC; 
  (e  Open civil or international armed conflict since 1990. See also Annex on Episodes of State 
Failure. 
 
A comprehensive analysis of country performance in terms of MDG achievement was 
undertaken by the UN Development Programme in 2003 (UNDP 2003). The report 
identified some 30 ‘top priority’ countries, signifying failure to make progress towards 
achieving the goals from already very low starting levels, and a further similar number 
of ‘high priority’ countries, which either harbour acute poverty levels and are making 
moderate progress towards the goals, or have medium poverty levels but are regressing. 
Countries are designated as top or high priority according to different goals (see 
Table 2).  
Of the countries in the poor-performers table, 32 are included in the top priority 
category for MDG non-achievement in two or more areas. Unfortunately, even this 
figure is probably understated because of data shortfalls. Intuitively, Burma, North 
Korea and Somalia would probably belong here too. Some of the transition countries 
from the former Soviet bloc (such as Tajikistan) would also be included. On the basis of 
the data available, the worst all-round performers were Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Tanzania 
and Togo, which all underperformed in three or more of the MDG criteria. The results 
confirm the predominance of Sub-Saharan Africa as the region of greatest concern. 
There are also inconsistencies in MDG performance. Countries which perform worse on 
some indicators perform better on others. There are variations over time. But while 
there is no definitive list of consistent under-performers, up to one-third of all 
developing countries are, by different measures, falling short of sustainable 
development progress. 
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Table 2 
MDG poor performers* 
  Top priority    High priority 
Income poverty (Goal 1)   
  Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic 
(CAR), Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, 





Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras  






Bolivia, Jamaica, Paraguay, Venezuela 
  
Hunger (Goal 1)   
  Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Zambia  
 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Mongolia, North Korea 
 
Iraq, Somalia, Yemen 
 
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, CAR, Congo, Gambia, 
Niger, Senegal, Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
 
Cambodia, India, Nepal 
 




Primary education (Goal 2)    
  Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, DR Congo, Mozambique, 
Niger, Tanzania 
 
Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia 
Botswana, Eritrea, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Namibia, Senegal 
 
United Arab Emirates 
 
Chile, Honduras, Venezuela 
  
Gender equality (Goal 3)   
  Burkina Faso, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, 







Child mortality (Goal 4)   
  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Ethiopia, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 




Iraq, Somalia, Sudan 
Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Niger, South Africa, Uganda 
 






Access to water (Goal 7)   
  Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Togo 
 





Cameroon, Malawi, Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, Niger, 






Access to sanitation (Goal 7)   
  Benin, CAR, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, 




Dominican Republic, Haiti  
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe
 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, 
Papua New Guinea 
 
Brazil, Mexico  
Note:  *  Excluding the smallest states and countries in transition, and subject to availability of 
country data.  Source: UNDP (2003a).   7
3  Fragility factors: maturity, government size, leadership, conflict 
What are the origins of fragility? And what are the conditions and circumstances which 
cause states to become and remain fragile? In this section we review several of the 
factors which help to explain why some developing countries are weaker and more 
poorly governed than others, starting with history. 
3.1 Maturity 
Some independent states have existed for many centuries; several millennia in the case 
of China. But most developing countries have led an independent existence for only a 
few decades, since the post-war end of colonialism. The so-called transition countries 
emerged (or re-emerged) when the Soviet Union splintered in 1991. Some states—such 
as Timor-Leste (2002)—are even newer than that, and some are still emerging—
Kosovo. Some states in the modern era have, in a sense, already come and gone: 
Somalia lasted for barely 30 years as a unified territory and is trying again to 
reconstitute itself.  
Longevity confers confidence and identity, and while it does not guarantee capability, it 
is true to say that most of today’s fragile states are among the newest. The experience of 
the post-war states has been highly variegated, however. Inevitably, the degree of 
colonial penetration was a major factor in these experiences, particularly in Asia and 
Africa, from where most of the post-war states emerged.7 (In Latin America, 
decolonization had been much earlier). In Asia, colonial rule was broad and shallow. 
There were not the resources to maintain a large presence, and given the strength of 
culture and religion, local elites were empowered as much as they were co-opted. 
Mostly, states emerged strongly from the colonial presence, but statehood was under 
assault from cold war rivalry in Indochina and the Korean peninsula, and by the 
contestation by minorities in several countries. The two states which were not formally 
colonized—Nepal and Thailand—were both under authoritative regimes, but adjusted 
very differently to the new era.  
In Africa, states in many cases had been the original creation of colonial powers, with 
national boundaries clumsily etched across ethnic lines. Some were thus inherently 
artificial and the deeper colonial presence attempted to foster new (western) traditions 
of education, religion and culture. Moreover, statehood was superimposed on the 
powers of local chiefdoms, whose authority had been determined in traditional ways, 
including heredity. Statehood was not underlined by ‘nationhood’ in the single-people 
sense and was an inherently unfamiliar concept. It tended to be identified with, and 
driven by, one strong man,8 often a pioneer of the independence movement. Some of 
these states became what have been described as ‘neo-patrimonial’. They depend on 
personalized exchanges, clientelism and politics by patronage. There is a strong 
executive—i.e. the male head of state—a weak judiciary and parliament and a corrupt 
and ineffective civil service (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). 
                                                 
7   See discussion in Pinkney (2003). 
8  In our table of fragile states, only two—Bangladesh and Liberia—are headed by women.    8
3.2 Big  government 
These executives were strong because much was expected of the state at independence. 
Worldwide, the growth of government had followed from the conduct of and recovery 
from two world wars. In the developing world, it was natural for the new governments 
to grasp the levers of political, social and commercial control. There was a patriotic 
attachment to big government and a prevailing sentiment of state nationalism.  
In most of the newer states civil society was weak, or lacking altogether. There were no 
organized social groups or political parties which states were required to accommodate 
and adjust to. The authoritarian governments which most often emerged in the newer 
states were thus ‘filling a vacuum that would have been filled in Europe by political 
parties, pressure groups, and a variety of autonomous bodies (Pinkney 2003).9 In most 
developing countries, the emergence of civil society, which helped to dilute the 
monopolization of political power by the state, was to come much later.  
The newly independent states also assumed wide-reaching economic powers made 
fashionable by the successful examples of state intervention in the west epitomized by 
the Marshall Plan, the emerging welfare systems and Keynesian-style demand 
management. The Soviet Union also provided a central planning model for many 
countries. Newly independent states took responsibility for building infrastructure, 
developing infant industries, directing agricultural production and playing a large part in 
the allocation of resources, including through the administering of prices and subsidies 
and the control of labour, foreign exchange and financial markets (World Bank 1997). 
These extensive powers of the state were used to very different effect. In some countries 
(including the East Asian tigers: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore), government 
built an efficient and well-coordinated planning system, while also investing in human 
resources through the social sectors. The private sector also thrived and was provided 
with incentives to develop. But in many other countries, state-led development turned 
out very differently. Public sectors became bloated and were run inefficiently, and the 
monopolistic powers of governments—often with political power overlapping with 
commercial and economic interest—left very little space for independent private 
enterprise and initiative to flourish. The ‘dirigiste dogma’ (Lal 1983) was driven as 
much by form as by function. Big government seemed the natural accompaniment of 
development and alternative means of public goods and service provision were never 
explored.  
An acid test of state effectiveness was the use of resources. Some developing countries 
used the commodity price booms of the early 1950s—and indeed in 2006—as a basis to 
expand state activities, but never adjusted to the ensuing decline in revenues. The oil 
price shocks of the 1970s were a proving ground. Some oil exporters, such as Malaysia, 
built productively on their windfall while others, such as Nigeria and Angola, used it 
                                                 
9   Pinkney (2003). See also IDS (2005): ‘Many countries in the South today have formal institutions of 
representation, accountability and administration built on models transferred from OECD countries, 
but they often work very differently. They lack legitimacy and effectiveness because they were not 
forged through a political process of state/society negotiation, and are not supported by socioeconomic 
structures that encourage organization around broader, common interests. In particular, organization 
around ethnic identity rather than economic interests can be problematic because the former is less 
likely to provide a basis for compromise, and for identifying positive sum outcomes’.   9
wastefully. For many oil importers, the shocks were disastrous. Many were driven to a 
level of indebtedness from which they have never recovered. But not all. In some, like 
South Korea, the government built economic strength through a deliberate policy of 
diversification. 
3.3 Leadership 
Leadership qualities have also played a critical part in determining development 
capacity, particularly in younger, institutionally immature states, where the character of 
the ruling elite, and particularly the head of government, can exert a major influence. 
Even in the absence of democratic institutions, enlightened and committed leadership 
can be instrumental in guiding countries onto paths of solid progress. But ill-motivated 
leadership will have the opposite result. Strong leaders can, for good or ill, create or 
influence policies and lay down norms of procedure and execution. Their personality 
and example is a further guiding factor. In many developing states, strong leaders often 
emerged from within the most disciplined and cohesive institution—the armed forces—
which then served to buttress the leader’s position. The manner in which they have led, 
however, has then depended on their personalities and their patterns of co-opting 
support within the elite: in the best case, by soliciting individuals on the basis of merit; 
in the worst case, through family and crony relationships. The record of generals has 
mostly been egregious. From Argentina to Burma, from Liberia to Zaire, development 
has suffered the depredations of military men. 
Damaging leadership has not been confined to military dictators; civilian leaders have 
also presided over self-interested kleptocracies. But there have also been some shining 
exceptions. Seretse Khama, the first President of Botswana, inherited an impoverished 
state from British tutelage in 1966. For the next 14 years, until his death in office in 
1980, Botswana had one of the fastest growing economies in the world, turning 
revenues from beef, copper and diamonds into investments in infrastructure, education 
and health. President Khama used his authority to foster democracy and promote the 
rule of law, helping to set the country on a course of steady progress, which has been 
followed by his two successors (Quett Masire in 1980, and Festus Mogae in 1998).10 
In pre-modern states, Weber (1946) emphasizes the significance of charisma and 
tradition in the vesting of authority. Charisma is the factor that precipitates the 
emergence of an individual leader, but tradition begets continuity and can reinforce 
dynastic tendencies, handing succession down the generations. It can also perpetuate 
authoritarian rule. The nature of leadership, and of its perpetuation, can take a very 
different hold over the fortunes of new states. Contrast the divergent fortunes of the two 
halves of the culturally homogeneous Korean society, led down different paths by 
strong but very differently motivated authoritarian regimes. One half has joined the 
OECD club of rich democracies as a full-fledged industrial power, while the other is a 
quintessential failed state and one of the single greatest threats to global security. 
                                                 
10  Botswana today has one of the highest levels of per capita income in Africa. But its success has not 
been entirely unalloyed: it suffers from chronic inequality, a very high rate of HIV/AIDS incidence 
and one of the lowest life expectancies in the world.   10
Some states that have benefited from strong and developmentally-effective leadership 
have never been democracies (Uganda, Vietnam). But most have become more 
democratic and clearly choice provides a better guarantee of good leadership. With very 
few exceptions, poorly-led crisis states have remained undemocratic and fragility and 
weakness are perpetuated where leaders are resistant to more democracy. 
3.4 Conflict   
Within the developing world, those states which have made the least progress and have 
remained mired in low income and high poverty levels have been the most prone to 
conflict, while those which have done relatively better have reduced the risks of conflict 
and insecurity. Here the statistical correlations are quite solid: there is a close empirical 
relationship between civil war and low income. Poverty increases the likelihood of civil 
war and war is a prime cause of poverty. Conflict vulnerability is also chronic: within 
five years, half of all countries securing peace slip back into conflict (Collier et al. 
2003). In our table of fragile states, nearly half of the poor performers are listed as 
conflict-prone.  
Over the last four decades, following completion of the main independence wave, there 
was a substantial increase in the number of civil wars. The 1990s saw a subsequent 
reduction. But while wars have been contained in Angola, Guatemala, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Peru and Sierra Leone, some long-standing conflicts have continued to 
fester (e.g., in Burma, Colombia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan and Uganda) and some new conflicts have started or been re-kindled 
(Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti and Nepal).11 
Civil war incurs huge costs and has been described as development in reverse. The 
human cost through loss of life is compounded by injury and permanent disability. 
There are also the psycho-social consequences associated with the destruction of 
livelihoods and the concern for survival. Economies are undermined, not just at the 
local level, but through the diversion of resources into expanded military budgets, at the 
expense of social development.  
Unfortunately, the impact of civil conflicts is rarely confined within one country. 
Fragility is exacerbated by conflict in a contiguous state. Civil wars in recent years in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic), Liberia, 
Rwanda, Somalia—and now Iraq—have all burst their borders, adding to refugee 
burdens and destabilising their neighbours.  
4 Aiding  fragility 
For the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) fragile states constitute 
‘difficult partnerships’, a term coined to connote countries (OECD/DAC 2001):  
                                                 
11 During the 1990s an estimated six million people were killed in violent conflict, most of them poor 
and civilian. Some 40 million people were internally displaced or became refugees, 80 per cent of 
them women and children.    11
where development objectives play little role compared with prolongation of 
power, with the result that partner governments do not have credible 
commitment to effective policies and their implementation….corruption and 
political repression, among other characteristics, are commonly associated with 
such regimes 
In 2002, the World Bank identified a category of low-income countries ‘under stress’ 
(LICUS), which pose liabilities for its lending portfolio. They include the delinquent 
debtors and the least bankable clients. Among bilaterals, the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) has defined a target group called Poverty Reduction in 
Difficult Environments (PRIDE). DFID talks about ‘difficult environments’ where the 
state is ‘unwilling or unable to harness domestic and international resources for poverty 
reduction’. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) refers to ‘failing, 
failed and recovering states’ and stresses concerns of conflict and security (USAID 2005). 
As these definitions imply, there are two dimensions of state fragility which donors seek 
to address: lack of political will and weak development capacity. State failure may reflect 
the unwillingness of a government to commit itself to policies of inclusion and human 
welfare, and to ensuring that available resources are utilized for productive purposes. Will 
may be bound up with political legitimacy. Where a regime is undemocratic and 
unrepresentative, its leadership is less likely to pursue a development agenda. 
Figure 1 
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Capacity determines effectiveness: in administration and service delivery, in the 
maintenance of order and security and in economic and resource management. Both will 
and capacity are important for effectiveness in the utilization of aid and for the quality 
of the relationship between recipients and donors. 
Figure 1 attempts to plot the two dimensions of fragility for several failing states.12 
Bolivia and Uzbekistan are shown as relatively more capacitated states (with stronger 
institutions and human resources). Sierra Leone is shown as relatively less capacitated, 
but more willing in its post-conflict phase. Several states, such as North Korea, are 
shown as lacking both capacity and will. The arrows indicate (often changing) trends 
towards or away from greater stability.  
The role of donors is to help countries to move from the fragility to the stability zone, 
by influencing political will and supporting development capacity. But there are no 
simple formulae linking aid and fragility and the record of aid has been ambiguous. The 
examples of Burma, Rwanda and Zambia—three quintessentially fragile states 
embroiled in different kinds of development crisis—are illustrative of this ambiguity. 
4.1  Burma—donors at odds 
Burma13 emerged at independence in 1948 with seemingly bright prospects, based on 
rich endowments of minerals and natural resources and highly fertile soil. It was widely 
regarded as having one of the most literate and educated workforces in the region. For 
most of its independent history, however, it has been ruled by military regimes, which 
have presided over impoverishment and internal conflict.  
The first Prime Minister was U Nu, a statesman who helped found the non-aligned 
movement along with India’s Nehru and Indonesia’s Sukarno. He was replaced in 1962 
in a coup by General Ne Win who came to dominate the government until the late 
1980s. In 1988 a military junta formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) following widespread anti-government rioting which was brutally put down 
by the army. The SLORC permitted elections in 1990 which were won in a landslide by 
the opposition National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of 
the country’s post-war liberation hero. The result was ignored by SLORC which has 
continued its iron rule (since 1997 as the equally euphemistic State Peace and 
Development Council) under the chairmanship of Than Shwe, effectively the head of 
state. 
Daw Suu, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, continues to retain iconic status 
within and outside the country and her treatment by the regime is considered by western 
donors to be a bellwether of democratic progress.14 She has been confined under house 
arrest for most of the period since 1988 and in May 2003 she was almost killed in a 
brutal massacre (‘Black Friday’) of NLD supporters orchestrated by the junta. 
                                                 
12 Figure 1 is inspired in part by the analysis in the USAID paper (2005) on ‘Service delivery in fragile 
states’. 
13  Also referred to as Myanmar by the regime. 
14   In reality, there have been periods during her house arrest when prospects for change were quite 
positive, and periods during her freedom when matters were worsening.   13
The country has been virtually isolated since the time of Ne Win who sought to take the 
country down the inward-looking ‘Burmese way to socialism’. The results in terms of 
human development indicators have been mostly disastrous and the country is probably 
much worse off now than at independence, belying the largely meaningless official 
statistics which purport to reveal significant progress.15 According to UN figures, 
poverty rates may be over 70 per cent of the population, one-third of all children are 
chronically malnourished16 and only 50 per cent of children complete primary 
education. There is a growing incidence of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.17 
Burma is a collection of semi-autonomous states of many different peoples, including 
Shans, Karens, Rakhine, Mon, Chin and Kachin. Following independence, Burma took 
an initially tolerant attitude towards these minorities. But the military juntas have since 
sought to repress any moves towards autonomy or separatism. The armed forces, or 
Tatmadaw, number almost 400,000 and have used appalling brutality in their dual war 
on democracy and separatism. These internal wars have diverted considerable resources 
away from development and accelerated the impoverishment of the country, driving 
large numbers of people across the borders to Thailand and Bangladesh. 
Burma is a comprehensively mismanaged military dictatorship. The junta runs much of 
the economy, including its key enterprises. There is little understanding of a market 
economy and despite its apparent expressions of interest in foreign investment, it 
succeeds in deterring investors through the preponderance of regulations and licences, a 
multi-tiered exchange rate and the absence of a private banking system. The regime is 
also heavily involved in the gem trade and the exploitation of natural gas, as well as the 
fast-diminishing forest resources. The junta has locked up large numbers of those 
opposed to the regime. It indulges in rampant human rights violations and the 
Tatmadaw has been accused of the most inhumane acts of war. Burma is the largest 
producer and exporter of heroin, after Afghanistan, and although production has fallen 
in recent years with the help of a UN-sponsored crop-substitution programme, the junta 
has been accused of involvement in the drugs trade. 
As the graph below indicates, Burma was a growing recipient of aid until the late 1980s 
when it reached over US$400 million per year. Since the SLORC assumed power, aid 
has fallen sharply overall, but individual donors have taken rather different stances in 
their dealings with the country, reflecting their individual interests. The western donors, 
for whom Burma holds little strategic significance, have shunned Burma because of its 
human rights record, its resistance to democracy and continuing incarceration of the 
main opposition leader. At one extreme is the USA which since 2002 has completely 
shut off all development assistance through the regime and tried to influence other 
donors to do the same. The Americans also seek to prevent the assistance of multilateral 
agencies such as the World Bank, IMF or UNDP going to any government recipients. 
                                                 
15 An official report on the MDGs produced in April 2005 claims average annual real growth above 10 
per cent between 2001 and 2004, an adult literacy rate of 93 per cent and steadily improving health 
statistics.  
16 According to James Morris who, as head of the World Food Programme, visited Burma in August 
2005. 
17 Hard facts have always been hard to come by. In the early 1980s, the author was the Burma 
correspondent for a country intelligence service and had to rely extensively on secondary sources.   14
The European donors have joined the USA in imposing sanctions on Burma—mainly 
through a travel ban on the leadership of SPDC (Burma’s State Peace and Development 
Council). But the investments by Unocal and Total in natural gas, which earn 
substantial annual royalties for the regime, are tolerated. Some European donors provide 
humanitarian assistance, mostly through non-governmental entities. The EU (and the 
USA) provides assistance to refugees from the Burmese minorities along the border 
with Thailand. Japan has taken a more ambivalent stance. It curtailed its major aid 
programme after 1988. Since 2003, assistance has been limited still further. It has not 
applied sanctions, however, and continues to provide aid to the regime. Total official aid 
in 2005, including humanitarian, amounted to about US$25 million.  
Burma’s largest donors, however, are not from OECD/DAC, but from its neighbours, 
China and India. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are also significant partners. 
Chinese influence is most evident in parts of the Shan and Kachin states bordering China, 
where transactions are made in Yuan and even the school curricula are in Chinese. China 
(and particularly the Yunnan administration) has invested in power-plants and 
infrastructure, mainly in order to support its own investments in the northern and eastern 
parts of the country. Some of the aid is in military hardware provided through loans, 
repayable in kind in raw materials. China has been allowed to establish a military 
surveillance station off the coast of Burma, and probably hopes eventually to develop a 
corridor across the country to facilitate the access of Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal. 
India’s aid also carries influence. Politically, it has anxieties about China’s growing 
role; economically, it is concerned to meet its growing energy needs. India has invested 
(with South Korea) in a new offshore gas field and it is providing infrastructure 
assistance, including the construction of a pipeline through which it intends to import 
natural gas. Thailand also benefits from Burmese gas and includes Burma in its 
programme of assistance to the three poorest ASEAN countries (also including 
Cambodia and Laos). Malaysia and Singapore also provide training and scholarships to 
Burmese as part of their own ASEAN assistance.  
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Western aid to this failing state is clearly not working. Humanitarian assistance is 
helping to support Burmese livelihoods, but it needs to be complemented by other forms 
of engagement. The regime has little capacity and little will—it is the lowest ranked 
country on our diagram (Figure 1)—but it is more entrenched than ever. Certainly, the 
junta will not change its ways as a result of western displeasure, as long as it enjoys 
the embrace of its neighbours.18 Just at a time when the US Congress is trying to isolate 
the regime further and tighten the screw on the multilateral organizations, observers in 
Burma are unanimous that exactly the opposite should happen. Western donors do not 
like to deal with egregious regimes but they should be concerned about turning failure, 
and its damaging consequences, around. If both capacity—in a country with chronically 
weak institutions of statehood—and will are to be enhanced, there is no alternative to 
more, not less, engagement.19 
4.2  Rwanda—complicity, oblivion and state collapse 
Rwanda is a central African country of eight million people. It is one of the world’s 
most conflict-prone states, with which donors have maintained ambiguous and at times 
perilous relations. The story of rich country involvement was already a complex one 
before 1962 when it came to independence against a backdrop of seething ethnic 
conflict. Belgium, the colonial power, had decided to prepare the ground by abolishing 
the monarchy and switching patronage from the minority Tutsi elite to the Hutu 
majority ‘in the name of a suddenly discovered attachment to democracy’ (Uvin 1998). 
On assuming sovereignty, the regime of President Kayibanda chased down and 
eliminated most of the Tutsi elite. In 1973, he was removed by his cousin General 
Habyarimana in a coup which ushered in a military dictatorship for the next 20 years. 
A modicum of stability was maintained, but it was a lid firmly battened on the ethnic 
Hutu-Tutsi rivalries beneath, a situation characterized as ‘structural violence’ (Galtung 
1969). Open conflict broke out in late 1990 with incursions from Uganda by a force of 
Tutsis who were exiled there. Civil war continued with sporadic outbreaks of fighting 
until April 1994 when Habyarimana was killed and the world’s worst genocide in the 
post-war period began, resulting in the slaughter of some 800,000 people—nearly all of 
them Tutsis—in the space of 100 days.20 Nine-tenths of the Rwandan population was 
dispersed by the fighting, within the country and over the border, and it was several 
years before resettlement was completed.21 
Against this turbulent background, Rwanda nevertheless had made reasonable 
development progress in its first two decades. Per capita income, food production and 
                                                 
18 ‘Sanctions, ostracism and tough talking have clearly all failed to make the slightest dent in the 
regime’s behaviour’, said the Economist (2005). 
19    Representatives of donors in Yangon (2005) all advocated more engagement, and in some cases 
expressed frustration with the policies of their capitals—an all too frequent pattern in the aid business. 
20 The massacres in Cambodia in the late 1970s were even more deadly, but they were not ethnically-
based. 
21   There is a large and passionate literature documenting the Rwandan genocide, including Melvern 
(2000); Gourevitch (1998); Keane (1995), and Prunier (1995). Most of these sources apportion a large 
part of the blame for the genocide on the international community.   16
the manufacturing sector all showed positive growth. The HDI improved quite 
significantly between 1975 and 1985. Rwanda seemed to be on a solid path. But then 
from the mid-1980s, progress started to unravel. There was drought in 1984 and from 
the following year, the export prices of coffee and tea began to slide. These factors 
caused the primary sector to shrink and set off a period of profound crisis which 
continued up to and beyond the genocide. Rwanda had no recourse but to turn to the 
international financial institutions to shore up a yawning external deficit. From modest 
levels in the early part of the decade, the country’s debt grew to more than 60 per cent 
of GNP by 1993, a long way beyond sustainability levels, since this was equivalent to 
more than eight times the value of its exports. 
From the mid-1960s, development assistance from the donor community flowed freely 
and showed a steady upward trend (see Figure 3) as the donors considered Rwanda 
something of a model among African developing countries. Up until the 1980s crisis, 
the country had been thought to be doing many things right. Although democracy was 
not practised and human rights were beneath the vision of the despotic first and second 
republics, the government was credited with a developmental orientation. Reports from 
the pre-genocide period talk of stability and discipline. As the economy deteriorated, 
some development assistance yielded to humanitarian, but the amount continued to 
grow. 
The general sense of goodwill towards Rwanda was one of the factors favouring high 
aid levels. Habyarimana was rewarded for maintaining stability. His popularity was not 
in question, and donors overlooked the autocratic nature of the regime whose mandate 
was regularly renewed with near-unanimity. The existence of a growing NGO sector 
was noted positively. For some donors, Rwanda was also linguistically strategic. Being 
at one of the borders between francophone and anglophone Africa, it was favoured by 
France, Belgium and Switzerland. 
But as history has subsequently told us, the donor community suffered a massive 
deception in Rwanda. In the early 1990s, while a few concerns had begun to surface 
about the nature of the Habyarimana regime, the international community neither spoke 
out against nor acted on the perpetration of structural violence which led directly to the 
massacre of 1994 (Uvin 1998). Rwanda was constructed on a foundation of 
institutionalized racism that marginalized the Tutsi minority. The regime also 
sanctioned an ill-intentioned militaristic elite (the Akazu) which manipulated the social 
and political processes to its own ends. Observers have been astounded by the rapidity 
of the call to arms by the Hutu and the incredible vehemence of the 100-day slaughter. 
But it can be at least partially explained by the existence of the genocidal edifice which 
Rwandan society had become. 
The donors missed the signals or chose to ignore them. The awful probability of either 
complicity or oblivion only compounds the sin of vacillation by the UN in 1994 which 
denied Rwanda a peacekeeping force, which many feel would have been able to 
forestall the genocide.22  
The aftermath of the genocide brought substantial new humanitarian aid, which also ran 
immediately into controversy. Very large numbers of Hutu people fled with the militias 
                                                 
22 For example, Dallaire (2003) and des Forges (1999).   17
who had committed the genocide into eastern Zaire, where they would undoubtedly 
have perished through hunger and disease. The first wave of humanitarian assistance 
was therefore concentrated on these perpetrators of the genocide, rather than the victims 
who remained in Rwanda. This bias was only gradually corrected, partly as a result of 
the enforced repatriation of the Hutus in 1995. 
In the development phase which followed, a somewhat different set of donors—more 
anglophone in profile—has emerged to champion Rwanda, which again continues to 
benefit from high levels of assistance. As the author witnessed in the late 1990s, there 
are some frightening echoes of the earlier ethnic myopia in some aid programmes. 
However, donors are more aware of the underlying social tensions and there is support 
for the re-building of a justice system and for fostering reconciliation. 
But Rwanda exposed many fallabilities of the ‘development enterprise’. The country 
has also proved to be a jousting field for donor influence. Some donors were historically 
and sentimentally loyal to the Hutu cause and acted accordingly. After the genocide, 
they played a limited role. Other donors emerged as supporters of the Tutsi government, 
whose leadership emerged from Rwanda’s anglophone neighbours. But then these new 
donors also became politically indulgent patrons. They maintained their high levels of 
assistance even after it became known that the new regime was actively perpetrating 
rebellion across the border in the Congo on a scale which went beyond mere self-
defence. 
Donor divisions linger as a result of differing perceptions of this aid client. Donors have 
made their own assessments of the intentions of the government and there is no 
collective view of where Rwanda is placed on the ‘will’ scale (Uvin 2001). Aid follows 
influence and is at least partially related to the degree to which individual donors 
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4.3  Zambia—an unsuitable case for Bretton Woods treatment 
Zambia is a land-locked country of ten million people in southern Africa. It came to 
independence in 1964 under the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda who ruled Zambia as a 
one-party state continuously for 27 years. His vision was of a dominant government 
with widespread ownership of productive assets. Soon after assuming power he 
nationalized many key enterprises, as well as all private land. Following the adoption of 
a multi-party constitution, Frederick Chiluba was elected president in 1991. But 
accusations of corruption and mismanagement dogged his decade-long tenure. 
Zambia has been a consistent poor-performer almost throughout its independent 
existence. Economic growth has been paltry, well below rates of population increase. 
During the 1990s, growth fell almost to zero (0.3 per cent per year). Consequently, per 
capita income has fallen from over US$750 at independence in 1964 to about half that 
level now. Poverty rates are close to 70 per cent of the population and rose during the 
last decade. The HDI, measuring income, education and health, has fallen from 0.47 in 
1975 to 0.39 today, ranking Zambia 164th out of 175 countries. Zambia is further than 
ever from achieving the MDGs, which span the 25-year period 1990-2015. 
Several factors have played a part in Zambia’s poor performance. Kaunda’s attempt to 
run the economy as a bureaucracy was a dampener on enterprise and efficiency. The 
economy was also heavily dependent on mineral production and exports (mainly 
copper, but including zinc and cobalt) and was seriously undermined by long-term falls 
in international prices, which brought the purchasing power of copper down to barely 
one quarter of the level of the 1960s. Zambia did not succeed in diversifying its 
economy away from the mining sector, but continued to incur loans in the expectation 
that copper prices would revive. The country is also disaster-prone. Droughts have been 
a persistent affliction and more recently HIV/AIDS—which the government was very 
slow to recognize and act upon—has ravaged the population. One in five adults is 
infected, life expectancy has fallen below 40 years, and more than half a million 
children have been orphaned.  
When it comes to aid, the country is an extreme example of why poor countries with 
falling export revenues, geographic disadvantage and a proneness to crises make highly 
unsuitable banking clients. Its international indebtedness began soon after the collapse 
of copper prices in the mid-1970s. The price never revived, no other significant sources 
of foreign exchange were ever developed, and the country has been saddled with the 
huge additional burdens of debt repayment and servicing ever since. By the late 1990s, 
international debt owed to donors and the Bretton Woods was larger than the country’s 
entire GNP. The cost of servicing this debt has mounted in spite of ‘emergency interim’ 
debt relief, but by 2004 the amount owed was close to US$400 million—more than the 
combined health and education budget of the government. Debt has dominated all other 
development efforts. It has been claimed that in that year an additional 9,000 available 
trained teachers—urgently needed for the expanding education programme—could not 
be hired because of spending restrictions imposed by the IMF-led macroeconomic 
programme (Oxfam 2004b). Aid has been generous, but fickle. At its peak in 1995, it 
reached the equivalent of 30 per cent of GNP, but fell back to a third of the level soon 
afterwards (see Figure 4). 
In fact, Zambia did not intend to remain a one-commodity economy. After 
independence, it established a domestic textile and garment industry, which by 1970   19
comprised more than 80 companies employing 10,000 workers. Like its agriculture, the 
manufacturing sector was walled off from foreign competition by high import tariffs—a 
strategy of incubation successfully followed by the dynamic economies of Southeast 
Asia. Much of the economy was in state hands and it was managed inefficiently. 
However, it was a broader-based economy in the making. 
When copper prices collapsed in the early 1970s, accompanied by huge hikes in the 
costs of imported oil, Zambia was forced to borrow. But the lending programmes of the 
Bretton Woods came with the familiar prescriptions of privatization and trade openness. 
During the 1990s, the state was urged to sell factories and lower import tariffs. The 
textile sector could not compete. During the decade, the number of textile manufacturers 
fell from 140 to 8 and the number of employees from 34,000 to 4,000. Zambia became a 
large importer of tariff-free second-hand clothes from the USA. The manufacturing 
sector as a whole did not fare much better. More than 300,000 jobs were lost out of 
800,000. 
That Zambia has been economically mis-managed is not in doubt. Yet trying to direct 
Zambia’s economic affairs from Washington with the support of some of the major 
bilateral donors has not succeeded in building capacity within the country. Numerous 
donors have brought their many forms of project assistance to bear. But the large 
bilaterals have tended increasingly to line up with the Washington agenda, cheerleading 
when the agenda advanced and withdrawing support when it foundered. In 1983, 
Zambia agreed to a structural adjustment programme and bilateral aid flowed 
generously (see Figure 4). After the abandonment of that agreement in 1987, some of 
the major donors reduced their assistance and the USA, UK and Germany temporarily 
suspended disbursements entirely. Aid again grew in the early 1990s as a positive 
response to the holding of democratic elections, and there was a spike in 1995 with the 
release of substantial IMF assistance (under the structural adjustment facility (SAF) and 
the extended SAF). Aid levels again dropped off however during the 1990s as the 
country was perceived to be slipping off the good governance track (Carlsson et al. 
2000). 
Zambia was one of 14 developing countries (eight of them fragile) recently included in 
an OECD/DAC survey of donor ‘harmonization and alignment’—a report card on the 
Rome process (OECD/DAC 2005). The survey maintains that Zambia has begun to take 
control of its development agenda. But it is an agenda based on a poverty reduction 
strategy paper (PRSP) and underpinned by a medium-term expenditure framework 
(MTEF) and a public expenditure management and accountability review (PEMFAR)—
all instruments (and acronyms) invented by, and developed in very close consultation 
with, the donor community.  
Today, Zambia is trying again to steer itself back to the donor agenda. But the 40-year 
aid balance sheet has scarcely been propitious. The country has received aid at some of 
the highest levels in Africa and it has borrowed well beyond the limits of debt 
sustainability. Yet its people are considerably poorer than at independence. In the matrix 
of fragility, capacity has remained stubbornly low, while the government has moved up 
and down the x-axis of willingness. There is no doubt that government attempts to run 
the state like a huge public sector utility sapped the economy of some of its dynamic 
potential. However, trying to force on the state a series of uncompromising reform 
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agendas has been politically unpalatable and has resulted in a growing, not a 
diminishing, dependence on external assistance. 
In sum, each of these three states has suffered from some of the major causes of 
fragility, including the four outlined above, but to differing degrees. All of them can be 
described as new and relatively immature states, their boundaries determined by 
colonial powers, vesting them at independence with a degree of artificiality. All three 
have also attempted to go down development paths characterized by excessive statism, 
from which Rwanda and Zambia are beginning to retreat. Burma is an extreme example 
of a monolithic state, having not developed either political or economic institutions of 
any significance outside the auspices of the current regime. 
Each of the three has also suffered from different kinds of leadership crisis, usually with 
a single strong-man at the helm. In Burma, a more enlightened leadership in its early 
days soon gave way to a series of security-obsessed and self-interested regimes. In 
Rwanda, the leadership showed a distinct ethnic bias, which led to serious distortions 
and created a ‘structurally violent’ society. Zambia had more benevolent but 
developmentally incompetent leadership. In both Rwanda and Zambia, however, the 
advent of more democratic openness will provide a counterweight to the risk of 
autocracy. Rwanda has been historically the most conflict-prone of the three, but in 
Burma regional ethnic aspirations have been harshly suppressed at enormous cost.  
In each of these states, donor engagement has been a very mixed blessing. It has not 
been very successful in altering political will, nor in building capacity. In fact, there are 
all too few examples of fragile states transported from failure to stability by aid. We 
need to know why if we are to propose how aid could become more effective. 
As the examples of three countries help to illustrate, the circumstances of every fragile 
state is unique. However, the two-dimensional (capacity/will) challenge of overcoming 
fragility and backwardness applies to all: how much are they willing to change and how   21
much are they able to improve? The most egregious regimes are the unwilling, those 
whose leaderships have impoverished their countries and are resisting change, whatever 
the reasons: dogma, greed, military paranoia, but invariably a determination to hold on 
to power whatever the development cost. In other fragile states, the leadership may be 
more amenable, but capacity is limited. Such would be the case in Liberia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and other countries emerging from conflict, or Mali, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Zambia and others seeking to compensate for poor management and the adversities of 
HIV/AIDS, natural disaster or global economic conditions. We shall look respectively 
at these challenges for donors. 
5  Aid and will—engagement and consistency 
There is an extensive literature on the limited effectiveness of donor conditionality.23 
Some of these arguments apply a fortiori to fragile states that are not in open conflict, 
but where the leadership is more entrenched and plays an unchallengeable role in 
steering the direction of the country. Since the record of conditional aid shows that it 
has limited impact in countries where the leadership is at least developmentally inclined 
and open to examining policy alternatives, aid with strings is even less likely to lead to 
beneficial change in the circumstances of fragile states. However, political engagement 
by donors can stimulate change if certain conditions are met. 
First, engagement can help to connect cynical regimes with global values. While it may 
be premature to talk of universal convergence, those values are becoming increasingly 
centred on more open democracy and market principles. This growing consensus can 
play a helpful framing role in advocating for political and economic change.  
Advocacy is being driven by demonstration, in a world in which globalization has 
sharpened the sense of inter-state competition and when development performances are 
compared more overtly than before. For example, reform in India has been goaded in 
part by a desire to catch up with the growth and income levels of China. South Korea 
has set its sights on Japan. Brazil, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, Thailand and others 
aspire to middle-income status. All these countries have been finding their own way to 
the democratic free-market road. 
Demonstration effects have become extremely powerful for at least two reasons. One is 
the spread of global information and media via new information technologies, which 
allow people in one country to learn about and compare life in almost every other. The 
second is the rise of the global civil society movement, which has helped to connect 
people within and between countries and act as an alternative voice to governments.24 
In the west we now take technologically-facilitated networking for granted, but 
connected civil society has become a redoubtable force for change. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, it helped turn Eastern Europe from autocracy and accelerated the demise of 
the Soviet Union by piercing the barriers to information exchange. It has raised the 
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aspirations of people in the developing world by making millions more aware of how 
much better their lives could be.  
Connectedness is specifically denied in the more abject examples of state failure such as 
Burma and North Korea, where governments have permitted very limited internet 
access and placed drastic restrictions on the media. As in the states of the Soviet Union 
before the break-up, isolation is taking a heavy toll. If these barriers cannot be broken 
down, then the role of donors should be to encourage more engagement, and not 
reinforce a country’s isolation. The process needs to start with this same cynical 
leadership. 
Engagement—through dialogue and demonstration—should then be the conduit of 
value change. Minds cannot be altered from behind unbroken walls, but they can see 
through the cracks. In the northern parts of both Burma and North Korea it is—almost 
ironically—China which is encouraging a furtive encroachment of capitalism via the 
development of free enterprise enclaves. These small bridgeheads could become 
significant forces for change, and could precede a wider opening of these societies. 
In the second place, solidarity and consistency are important. The impact of US and 
European sanctions on Burma is already diluted by the breaches in their own foreign 
investment ban. But more importantly, the country’s immediate neighbours are willing 
to engage. To be effective, Burma’s partners should—at least with respect to 
influencing political will—speak with a single voice. Similar arguments apply to 
Zimbabwe. The political (if not the economic) impact of US and European sanctions is 
undermined by close and generally uncritical relations which the country enjoys with 
South Africa and China. On Cuba, the world is similarly divided—the US and Canada 
cannot agree on relations with the regime (even to the extent of the US threatening to 
impose sanctions on Canadian and European companies which continue to do business 
with Havana). The chinks must be mended, not only between the rich states, but among 
all the partners of fragile states. 
An OECD consensus around fragile states has often proved elusive. But aid from the 
rich West is losing its influence anyway. Trade and economic relations within 
developing regions are growing in importance, and non-DAC donors, such as India, 
China and Brazil have entered the stage. India looms large on the strategic horizons of 
its neighbours, including the fragile states of Burma and Nepal. China has long been a 
significant donor to recipient countries in Asia and in Africa (where it has built a sports 
stadium in virtually every country).25 Through aid, it actively supports weak states such 
as North Korea, Burma, Laos and Zimbabwe. Like India, China’s aid is strongly 
influenced by commercial interest, currently driven by the need to secure supplies of 
energy and raw materials to fuel its voracious expansion. The desire for influence leads 
to aid, and vice versa. In 2005 and 2006, China has succeeded in preventing Sudan from 
a harsher censure by the UN Security Council over Darfur, and it is an important 
counterweight to western donor interest as a member of the ‘Group of 77’ developing 
countries. 
In some circumstances, regional organizations could play a role in influencing states. 
For Burma, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which it belongs 
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(along with Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and others), could help the international 
community to forge a common position on a desirable political roadmap for the country. 
An opportunity has already been provided by the agreement by Burma not to take up 
chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006, in order to save the grouping from an embarrassing 
boycott by western countries. A similar position with respect to Zimbabwe could be 
taken by an African subregional grouping (such as the South Africa Development 
Community (SADC) to which South Africa and Zimbabwe both belong) or by the 
African Union, which plays a more political role in the continent.  
Third, donors need to stay engaged with the people of fragile states. Their humanitarian 
needs should be met even though they are exacerbated by the actions of misguided 
leadership. Humanitarian engagement is important for several reasons. One is obviously 
altruistic. Others are more political. Aid connects people in need with the international 
community and is a foundation for building longer-term goodwill beyond periods of 
crisis. Humanitarian aid has its own beneficial demonstration effect from the sacks of 
‘USAID’ wheat and UNHCR tenting to the selfless toil of the camp doctors. 
Humanitarian aid, if sensitively applied, can make an example of bad government. 
In sum, (i) engagement is better than isolation, particularly where fragile states are 
already seeking to isolate themselves; (ii) engagement should be consistently applied 
and based on collective action, preferably backed by the authority of a regional 
grouping and by globally acknowledged norms of international comportment; (iii) donor 
engagement should take full cognisance of, and attempt to compensate for, the 
humanitarian plight of the populations in fragile states who are the victims of wrong-
headed policies which are driving them to impoverishment. 
6  Aid and capacity 
The record of aid in building sustainable capacity has been a very mixed one, even 
where leadership is committed. The record is unfortunately no better in the building or 
reconstruction of fragile states, where failure comes at much higher costs, but where the 
dividends of success can be enormous. 
In this section, we review the impact of aid on capacity in three different scenarios: 
during what may be described as ‘pre-conflict’ periods; during conflict; and during 
periods of reconstruction and state-building (which are quite often post-conflict). 
6.1 ‘Pre-conflict’ 
Somalia in the mid-1980s was a country at peace, and Mogadishu was one of the safest 
capitals in Africa. But all was not well. A despotic president ruled with total intolerance 
of dissent as well as indifference to the process of development. The country was one of 
the most generously aided in the world but the donors were having a negligible impact 
on either the policies of the regime or the capacities of the country. Supply-driven aid 
carried the donors’ trademarks and the landscape was littered with some of the starkest 
relics of aid failure: broken tractors, silted pumps, fuel-less turbines, vacant schools, 
darkened hospitals and crumbling new roads to nowhere. Typical of ‘capacity building’ 
was a large bilateral programme at the National University of Somalia, worth much 
more than the total national education budget. The main beneficiaries were the   24
expatriate professors from the donor country who enjoyed lucrative 6-monthly tours of 
duty in the capital. 
Somalia began to implode in the late 1980s as the president sought with mounting 
desperation to hold onto power, favouring his own and discriminating against unfriendly 
clans. A country in which so much hope had once been vested as an example of unique 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious uniformity, splintered into domains of warlord-
ism and remains divided today.26 In 1960, the international community had successfully 
reunited Somalia under a UN mandate but subsequent donor interests were dominated 
by cold-war competition. First the Russians sought to bring the country into their sphere 
and then, quite abruptly, the western camp, as allegiances switched in 1977. When the 
country began to fall apart, the western donors departed except for the hardiest 
humanitarian agencies. Unluckily for Somalia, the cold war was ending and most of the 
remaining strategic interest in the country evaporated. Italy—the former colonial 
power—decided to back one of the warlords attempting to form a new government, but 
he was virulently opposed by other factions and civil war raged openly from 1991. The 
international community returned to Somalia in 1993 but in different guise. 
Through complicity in or oblivion to state collapse, Rwanda has also taught us that aid 
can do harm in the wrong circumstances, with deadly results. The nexus between aid 
and conflict is extremely delicate and deserves much closer and more subtle 
consideration than it has received in the past (Andersen 1999). To the sounds of stable-
doors closing, there has been considerable donor introspection on Rwanda, Somalia, 
Bosnia, Angola and the many other war-torn states. It has led to the development of 
increasingly sophisticated methodologies for analysing conflict-proneness,27 as well as 
whole new ‘crisis’ departments. This new-found conflict sensitivity among donors is 
only to be welcomed. As with much that is good about donor intention, however, it is 
important that it is followed in practice. 
6.2 During  conflict 
Attempts by the international community to stop civil wars have had mixed success. An 
analysis by Dobbins et al. (2005) finds that of seven UN-led peacekeeping operations 
since 1989, all had been partially or wholly successful.28 Where the USA led the 
missions, or was heavily involved, there were successes in Bosnia and Kosovo, but 
failures in Somalia and Haiti (Dobbins et al. 2003).  
Somalia was a watershed, for troops were sent in for the first time under a Chapter VII 
UN Charter mandate to try to quell a civil conflict through force, without a government 
invitation. The intervention was, as we know, spectacularly unsuccessful. Soldiers under 
UN command were killed, prompting the US to send troops to join them. But when the 
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US lost 18 of its own men,29 they began to withdraw. By 1995, there were no UN 
troops in Somalia, but civil conflict—albeit at a more subdued level—still simmered. 
Rwanda was another failure when, in April 1994, the UN did not deploy peace-
enforcing troops which by all accounts could have stopped the slaughter of 800,000 
civilians. Unquestionably, failure in Somalia was a factor in dissuading intervention in 
Rwanda, although the two situations and the anticipated results would have been very 
different. Again since 2004, a UN mandate has not been forged in time to quell 
genocide in Darfur (Sudan). 
Whatever the outcomes of these peace-enforcing initiatives, an important threshold was 
crossed in the 1990s. For the first time since the beginning of the post-war 
independence movement, sovereignty is being subordinated to the notion of wider 
responsibility. As the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change puts it:  
successive humanitarian disasters  …  have concentrated attention not on the 
immunities of sovereign governments but their responsibilities, both to their 
own people and to the wider international community (UN 2004).  
The Panel—which comprised eminent persons from both north (seven) and south 
(nine)—went on to provide the rationale for engagement:  
while sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect their 
own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do 
so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community. 
In effect, the right to intervene under Chapter VII is reinterpreted as responsibility to 
protect:  
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing 
military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large 
scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or 
unwilling to prevent. 
The report provides a clear mandate for intervention in Sudan. 
In spite of mixed outcomes, international engagement is morally correct where regimes 
have lost control. There is also an important economic rationale. While enforcing and 
keeping the peace can be expensive, the prospect of reducing the catastrophic costs from 
civil conflict can easily be justified. By way of illustration, an economic study has 
attempted a cost-benefit analysis of peacekeeping initiatives (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). It yields an impressively positive ratio. Based on the record of recent civil wars, 
it finds that US$4.8 billion spent on peace-keeping could yield almost US$400 billion in 
benefits. 
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6.3  Reconstruction and state-building 
After conflict, and in all other circumstances where states are attempting a fresh start, 
the role of development assistance can and should be of primordial importance in 
building sustainable new capacity. As conflicts are resolved, as wills turn, and as 
persistent non-performance finds fewer excuses, there is a keener edge to the realization 
that rich countries hold some of the keys to the prosperity of the recipients. More-of-the-
same aid will perpetuate failure because it has for so long pursued the wrong objectives. 
A recent verdict by Francis Fukuyama (2004) on the role of gap-filling is less than 
sanguine: ‘the international community is not simply limited in the amount of capacity 
it can build; it is actually complicit in the destruction of institutional capacity in many 
developing countries’. And speaking of the public sector in fragile states, he goes on the 
say that the ‘…deterioration in capacity has happened precisely during a period of 
accelerating external aid flows’. The correlation may not be robust, but the fact is that 
donors’ efforts in capacity development have failed to arrest failure. 
The author’s own conclusions from a study of aid and capacity development in six 
major aid recipients, two of them on our ‘fragile’ list (Bangladesh and Uganda), are also 
sceptical about the sustainability of the results of past aid: 
The outputs of aid projects have abounded and these are manifestations of 
development. But they are also in part a substitute for it … many countries 
have not been able to use technical assistance [TA] as a tool to build 
sustainable capacities and manage their development independently. The word 
sustainable is important. Inappropriate TA, far from building sustainability, 
may undermine it (Browne 2002). 
But if it is not to be more of the same, then more of what? Analysis suggests that there are 
several ways in which aid could be better applied to the reconstruction of fragile states. 
Treat every case as unique: ‘know thy subject’ 
No two fragile states are similar. They are not similar in current profile, and there are 
always unique sets of causes of fragility. We should therefore beware of standard 
typologies, as well as the kind of standardized solutions which have undermined aid 
effectiveness in the past. Donors have an uncomfortable tendency to consider some 
fragile states as ailing patients amenable to standard types of treatment, whether 
humanitarian, reconstructive or developmental. There are some common manifestations 
of fragility, however, and these can be used to determine appropriate types of donor 
engagement. As mentioned earlier, they include: institutional maturity; nature of 
leadership; size and role of state; and proneness to conflict. 
The proclivity for standardization is related to a poverty of learning which must also be 
addressed. Donor and development agencies are notorious re-inventers of wheels. There 
are many thousands of development practitioners who would have worked in or on any 
one of the recipient countries, fragile states included. There is a vast and rich experience 
to draw on, but it is rarely captured, codified and shared even within individual 
agencies, let alone between them.30 Because this knowledge is not tapped, standardized 
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clean-slate solutions are often applied to states in crisis by donor staff who actually have 
very limited experience of the countries in question and who fail to discover and build 
on the experience of others. 
Understand what state capacity means 
The challenge in fragile states is the reconstitution of basic state functions of three 
general kinds: political and institutional; economic and social; security. All are 
important and they are interconnected. Table 3 outlines some of the main challenges 
which need to be addressed in these three spheres, implying that any aid effort should be 
both broad-based and finely-tuned. 
Table 3:  
Major characteristics of fragile and war-torn states 
  Fragile states   + Conflict prone 
POLITICS  
  Lack of regime legitimacy  Exclusionary policies; discrimination against 
ethnic/other marginal groups 
  Concentration of government power    
  High centralization  Poor/non-existent communications with regions 
  No opposition parties  Armed insurgency 
  Lack of transparency; no access to information   
  High levels of corruption   
  No access to justice   
  Weak/no civil society   
  No fair elections   
  Incapacity to provide services   
    
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL   
  Poor human development indicators  Civilian casualties; refugees; internally displaced 
people; child soldiers 
  Low income; low growth   
  Dependence on single export commodity   
    
  Severe income/asset inequalities  Competing claims to assets/resources 
  High HIV/AIDS incidence  HIV spread by armed forces 
  Excessive state control of productive sectors   
  Chronic budget deficit  Excessive military spending 
  Chronic external indebtedness   
 Poor/deteriorating  infrastructure  Extensive damage through conflict 
  Absence of economic opportunities; high 
unemployment 
Economic disruption; livelihoods based on war 
conditions 
  Weakened social capital  Destruction of communities; culture of violence 
and mistrust 
    
SECURITY  
  Oversized security forces  Proliferation of small weapons among opposition 
groups and citizenry 
  Armed forces control over internal security   
  No accountability of armed forces   
 Culture  of  impunity   
    
Source:  Ball (2002) and author.   28
An understanding of the different dimensions of state capacity is also vital, but there has 
been a tendency in the past for donors to concentrate on state size as of primordial 
importance. It is true that oversized public sectors, in concentrating too many resources 
and powers to themselves and using them inefficiently, have been a detriment to 
development progress. But the alternative is not simply the dogmatic pursuit of small 
government and the wholesale reduction of state capacity. There are activities of 
governments that may be better in private hands, but there are important functions of 
government that also need strengthening. The planning and formulation of national 
policies; the promulgation and enforcement of laws; the guaranteeing of basic social 
services—these are just a few of the indisputably essential state functions. Fukuyama 
makes the useful distinction between the scope of state activity—some of which could 
be reduced—and the strength of state power—which often needs strengthening 
(Fukuyama 2004). 
As part of the Washington paradigms, many western donors have been over-zealous in 
their advocacy of privatization in developing countries (reduction in state scope). But 
there has been inadequate attention to the development of adequate checks and 
safeguards under public auspices (state strength) to ensure that privatization results in 
better and more affordable services and that public good (e.g., universal service) is not 
sacrificed to private gain (von Weizsacker, Young and Finger 2005). 
Build up, not down 
One of the more serious illusions in donor approaches to capacity development is the 
notion of gap-filling. The build-down fallacy is based on the assumption that there are 
‘levels’ of capacity that can be prescribed in advance, that the gaps between these levels 
and present levels can be determined, and aid provided as the filler. All too often gap-
filling approaches lead to the artificial grafting of ‘capacity solutions’ onto unwilling 
institutional hosts. Where these solutions amount to a significant diversion for these 
institutions, long-term capacity may actually be undermined. 
In reconstructing fragile states especially, building up, rather than down is all the more 
imperative. Donors need to take cognisance of the capacity that exists, whether in the 
public, private or civil sectors. Where governments are weak, or where they barely exist 
as in the first stages of rebuilding after conflict, humanitarian assistance through 
multilateral organizations and through international NGOs provides for populations 
directly. But as stability is restored, appropriate local partners—within or outside the 
state sector—should be brought in and their capacity to administer services gradually be 
built up.31 
Eschew lending and top-down prescriptions 
When we looked at Zambia, we discovered an unsuitable case for the standard Bretton 
Woods lending treatment, whereby countries in difficulty are given loans well beyond 
any realistic prospect of repayment, in return for some forcible advice on reforming 
their economies. In many cases, this advice has led to the shrinking of the state sector 
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and the cutting of vital public services like health and education, already circumscribed 
by the necessity to repay the mounting costs of lending. When the author lived in 
Somalia in the mid-1980s, the same prescriptions were being paid for and the scramble 
was already on to find donor grants to pay off the IMF and World Bank. In Haiti, in the 
early 1990s, new aid was contingent on new grants to pay World Bank and IMF arrears. 
This rob-Peter-pay-Paul merry-go-round has continued for over two decades, in fact 
about as long as structural adjustment itself. The momentum is maintained because even 
where multilateral debt is cancelled through new gifts of aid, the lending process repeats 
itself. The July 2005 G8 meeting in Scotland, like almost every other before it, began 
with the familiar hand-wringing on indebtedness and ended with another ‘path-
breaking’ declaration on debt cancellation. But among the big bucks, the small penny 
hasn’t dropped: many countries, and most of the fragile ones, were never suitable clients 
for the Washington consensus. The results are eloquent enough evidence. 
In fact, the World Bank has begun to provide more grant assistance—an average of 
around 20 per cent—out of its international development association (IDA) programmes 
for the poorer countries. Donors, outside and within the multilateral system, should 
provide only grants to fragile states and they should also retreat from imposing their 
agendas. Rather, as part of ground-up capacity development, they should allow 
consensus to build around national strategies. 
Choose an intermediary 
Donors do harm by bringing their own agendas to their support for weak states, and one 
of the hardest principles to try to enforce is one of donor disinterest. Iraq is an extreme 
case. Over Rwanda, donors have also manifested their strong individual interests, and 
there is baggage of different shape and bulk associated with many other fragile states. 
Many of these interests relate to the old colonial ties of European countries (mainly UK, 
France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands) and Russia. 
In circumstances of chronic administrative weakness and high insecurity, donor 
engagement with fragile states needs to be mediated, preferably through multilateral 
means, until the governments concerned can gain the strength and confidence to play 
the mediation role themselves. The UN, OECD, or a suitable regional grouping can play 
such a role—even a bilateral - but not an organization with a significant financial stake 
or other special interest in a country. Smart mediation is not just about managing the aid 
but managing the transition process cohesively across the whole range of state capacity: 
political and institutional; economic and social; security.32  
The UN can claim some success in concerting the management of recovery processes 
following serious conflict. The UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) was 
set up following the signing of the Paris Agreements in October 1991. With support of 
different donors, it organized elections, maintained security, helped re-establish the civil 
administration, rebuilt some infrastructure and repatriated and resettled refugees and 
displaced people. In Timor-Leste, the UN established another Transitional Authority 
following 1999 elections to lead the country to independence (May 2002). UNTAET 
administered the territory, exercised legislative and executive authority and helped build 
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capacity towards self-government. It was succeeded after independence by the UN 
Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which continued to provide assistance 
to core administrative structures of the new country.33 After conflict, the UN also 
assisted in the establishment of an interim administration in Afghanistan in 2001, led by 
Afghans, to lead the country to elections and rebuild capacity. The organization of these 
arrangements could be further improved.34 For post-conflict states, the UN Secretary-
General has accepted the proposal of the High-Level Panel for the establishment of an 
intergovernmental peace-building commission. It would seek to improve UN planning 
and coordination in the immediate recovery phase, help to ensure predictable financing, 
encourage donors to share information about their programmes, monitor progress and—
importantly—‘extend the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery’ (UN 
2005). 
These arrangements are possible and necessary where governments are chronically 
weak or virtually non-existent, and where even country representation is unclear. In 
other circumstances, local administrations should be supported. They should be assisted 
at an early stage of rehabilitation to develop comprehensive strategies that lay down a 
clear itinerary, setting out tasks and timing, and identifying resources and 
responsibilities. A monitoring mechanism is also needed, and there have been proposals 
for ‘transitional results matrixes’ to track progress. 
Coordinate aid 
This principle is all of a piece with the preceding one. If assisted rehabilitation is to 
succeed, then donors need to subsume their individual programmes for a country within 
a coordinated framework. This could mean the adoption by individual donors of specific 
parts of an agreed recovery programme, or the contribution of unearmarked resources 
into a central pool. 
Donors have been agonising for many years about coordination and harmonization and 
some progress is being made.35 There are agreements by a growing number of bilateral 
agencies to untie their assistance and mingle it more flexibly with that of others. But to 
be effective, aid needs to move a radical step beyond the adaptation of individual 
practices by donors to each other. In each instance, there should be complete alignment 
with the frameworks and management capacities of recipients. However, the principle 
of country alignment needs to be reaffirmed, especially in the context of recovery and 
rehabilitation. 
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Sustain the support 
Being to a significant degree supply-driven, aid is subject to the vagaries of donor 
circumstances and preferences. Individual recipients are often subject to ebbs and flows. 
For recovering fragile states, sustained capacity development cannot be realized without 
an assurance of resources over the long-term, and donors need to sign up to multi-year 
engagements. 
To encourage sustained support, aid planning needs to become more open-ended. Even 
while broad objectives need to be defined to permit the monitoring of progress, planning 
should not be narrowly tied down—project-style—to fixed costs within strict time 
boundaries. Indeed, traditional project approaches should be avoided entirely. 
Facilitating the renewal of capacity is fundamentally an unpredictable, even 
idiosyncratic, trial-and-error process, especially in the more hazardous contexts of 
fragile states. 
Be coherent 
Donors give with one hand and take with the other. Surprisingly, the necessity to view 
donor engagement in terms of the totality of economic and other interactions with 
recipients has virtually eluded the analysis of aid effectiveness until very recently. Yet, 
the impact of bilateral trade terms, investment patterns, migratory flows and other 
factors can have consequences which outweigh, and often directly detract from, the 
potential benefits of aid.  
An interesting attempt to gauge the comparative impacts on developing countries of a 
range of donor policies has been undertaken by the Center for Global Development 
since 2003. A ‘commitment to development index’ is calculated for the 21 richest donor 
countries, ranked according to their policies on aid (relative amount, destination, aid 
tying, project density), trade (import tariffs and domestic agricultural subsidies), 
investment (incentives to invest in south), technology (share of research and 
development in GDP), security (contributions to peacekeeping), environment (levels of 
pollution emissions, commitment to multilateral agreements) and migration (net 
immigration flows from the South).36 There have been other attempts to determine in 
global terms the total resource flows between donors and recipients. For example, 
World Bank sources reveal that in 2003 there was a net reverse financial flow—from 
south to north—of over US$200 billion. Aid and other private capital inflows were 
dwarfed by loan repayments and purchases of foreign exchange (World Bank 2004, 
quoted in ActionAid 2005)  
Fragility is exacerbated by these uneven terms. Any comprehensive solution to the 
challenges facing fragile states must take into account not only the non-aid inflows of 
resources, but also the outflows and the financial and other impediments for which the 
same donor countries are responsible. This must be done, not globally, but on an 
individual country basis. Balance sheets should be drawn up, calculating with respect to 
each major donor the total financial value of the bilateral relationship. The trade/aid 
nexus alone is important. The rich countries collect in tariffs on the imports of some of 
the poorest much larger sums than they provide in aid to the same countries. The 
subsidies provided to rich country farmers distort global markets against the interests of 
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lower-cost producers in the poorer countries.37 Manifestly, donor engagement with 
fragile states cannot just be about aid. It has to encompass the totality of bilateral 
economic and other relationships. 
7 Conclusion 
How donors meet the challenges of fragile and failing states provides the acid test for 
aid. While most aid has been a vehicle for donors to build relationships with individual 
developing countries, the predicament of the fragile states presents two outstanding 
justifications for activism. One is obviously humanitarian, since development failure has 
continued to impoverish the lives of many hundreds of millions of people. The other is 
self-interest, given the dangers posed by the fragile states to global security and health. 
The donor record is patchy to say the least. And the closer you come, the worse it looks. 
Donors bear some responsibility for not being there, but that is not the worst accusation. 
Donors also appeared at the wrong times with the wrong attitudes. Working within their 
own scripted agendas, they succeeded in sometimes unpicking and undermining 
development progress.  
Now, being there in the right frame is the urgent order of the day. Failure demands 
constructive engagement, in some cases to save people from their leaders, and in all 
cases to save some of those failing states from circumstances they cannot control. These 
adversities are in some cases natural, such as isolation and drought. But mostly they are 
man-made, whether triggered by internal demagogy, HIV/AIDS and strife, or resulting 
from conditions which the rich countries themselves can control and ameliorate. Aiding 
the fragile states means more and better forms of engagement. It also means lifting 
some of the impediments to progress.   
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